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Abstract 
DoSen, K. Nonmodal classical linear predicate logic is a fragment of intuitionistic linear logic, 
Theoretical Computer Science 102 (1992) 207-214. 
It is shown that nonmodal classical linear first-order predicate logic based on multiplicative 
conjunction, additive disjunction, negation, the propositional constants and the existential quan- 
tifier is included in intuitionistic linear first-order predicate logic. An analogous result is obtained 
for BCK logic. 
1. Introduction 
It is well-known that the classical propositional calculus formulated with conjunc- 
tion and negation as primitive connectives is a fragment of the intuitionistic proposi- 
tional calculus; namely, the conjunction-negation fragments of these two calculuses 
coincide. A similar result holds neither for the conjunction-negation-universal 
quantifier fragment (l(tlxllA A 1VxA) is valid classically, but not intuitionisti- 
tally), nor for the conjunction-negation-existential quantifier fragment (3xl(A A 
3xlA) is valid classically, but not intuitionistically), nor for any other fragment in 
the standard voculary sufficient to formulate the whole of classical first-order 
predicate logic. In this note we shall show that in linear logic the situation is different. 
There is in the standard vocabulary a fragment of nonmodal classical linear first-order 
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predicate logic, sufficient to formulate the whole of this logic, that coincides with 
the corresponding fragment of intuitionistic linear first-order predicate logic. 
However, as we shall see, this result cannot be extended to modal linear logic. The 
proof of this result depends essentially on the lack of Contraction in linear logic, 
but does not depend on the lack of Thinning. So, we can prove a completely 
analogous result for linear logic extended with Thinning, i.e. BCK logic. 
Classical linear logic that is included in intuitionistic linear logic makes a Hilbert- 
type system. In other words, we are speaking about formulae of a first-order language 
and not about sequents. This must be stressed because we shall present classical 
and intuitionistic linear logic as sequent systems and prove our result via cut 
elimination. 
Recently, it has been proved in [4] which fragments of negationless classical 
linear logic and intuitionistic linear logic coincide. This result is different from what 
we are showing below; namely, that the whole of nonmodal classical linear logic, 
including its classical negation, is a fragment of intuitionistic linear logic. 
Notation is a vexing matter in linear logic, and we owe the reader an explanation 
concerning the course we shall follow. Except for a new sign for multiplicative 
conjunction, we shall use signs that are common in classical, intuitionistic, relevant 
and modal logic. For example, linear implication will be written as --f. The analogy 
between classical, intuitionistic, relevant and linear implication is not superficial. 
All these connectives have a common denominator in Gentzen-type rules that may 
be given for them, and similarly with other logical constants. Next, we shall use 
signs of one sort for constants within the multiplicative family and signs of another 
sort for constants within the additive family. Using signs of the same sort for a 
multiplicative and an additive constant is bound to make uneasy even those who 
otherwise favour the notation of [2] (the minor adaptations of [S] meant to overcome 
this shortcoming are prone to generate confusion). 
2. The language L 
Let I!, be a first-order language with the following logical vocabulary (which in 
parentheses is translated into the corresponding notation of [2]): 
l binary connectives: + , ., A, v (4, 0, &, 0); 
l unary connective: 1 (superscribed I); 
l nullary connectives: t, f, T, F (1, I, T, 0); 
l first-order quantijiers: Vx, 3x (Ax, Vx). 
We assume L has infinitely many individual variables (we do not have different 
symbols for free and bound variables). We use the following schematic letters: 
l individual variables: x, y, z, . .; 
l individual terms: a, b, c, . ; 
l jbrmulae: A, B, C, . . .; 
l _/kite, possibly empty, sequences gfjormulae: X, Y, Z, . . , 
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possibly with subscripts or superscripts. A schema of the form Ai will stand for the 
formula obtained from A by substituting the term a for every free occurrence of x 
provided, as usual, that a is free for x in A. We may define At, B as (A + B) A 
(B+A). 
3. Intuitionistic linear logic 
A sequent of L is an expression of the form Xk Y. We say that a sequent system 
is in L iff it is formulated with sequents of L. The system LL, of intuitionistic linear 
Iogic is the sequent system in L given with the following postulates, i.e. axiomatic 
sequent-schemata and rules: 
Structural postulates: 
(id) AFA 
(Cut) 
Xt-Y,A A,Z+W 
x,ztY, w 
(Permutation L) 
X,A, B,Zf- W 
X, B,A, Zk W 
Operational postulates: 
(+L) 
X+Y,A B,Z+W 
(+R) 
A,Xt-Y,B 
A+B,X,ZkY, W X+Y,A-+B 
(.L) 
A, B, X k W 
A.B,Xt W 
( ’ R) 
XtY,A ZbU,B 
X,Zky, lJ,A.B 
(AL) 
A,XI-W B,XkW 
Ar\B,XtW AhB,XtWE 
(AR) 
X+-Y,A X+Y,B 
XFY,AAB 
(VL) 
A,Xt W B,Xt W 
AvB,Xt-W 
(vR) 
XkY,A XtY,B 
XtY,AvB XtY,AvB 
(1L) 
X+Y,A 
lA,XtY 
(t L) 
xtw 
t,x+w 
(fL) ft 
(-&,,) 
A,XFY 
X+Y,lA 
provided Y is empty 
(tR) k-t 
(f R,,,) XtY 
Xt- Y,f 
provided Y is empty 
(T Ri,,) X F- Y, T provided Y is empty 
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(F Li,,) F, X E W provided W is a single formula or empty 
WI 
A,‘,Xt W 
‘dxA,Xk W 
VW 
XtY,A; 
XE Y.VxA 
provided y is not free in the conclusion 
(3L) 
A;,Xt W 
3xA,X+ W 
provided y is not free in the conclusion 
(3R) 
X+Y,A:, 
XE Y,3xA 
As usual, Xk Y is called a single-conclusion sequent iff Y is a single formula or 
empty. It is easy to check that only single-conclusion sequents are provable in LL,. 
This means that the postulates for LL, could all have been formulated with the 
provisos that Y and U are empty and W is a single formula or empty. We have 
written down these provisos only at places where they are essential. The postulates 
(lRi,,), (f Ri,,), (T R,,,) and (F L,,,) without the provisos will be called (lR), (f R), 
(T R) and (F L), respectively. 
We can demonstrate cut elimination for LL, by standard Gentzen techniques; 
namely, if a sequent in which no variable occurs both free and bound is provable 
in LL,, then it is provable without (Cut). From this cut elimination and the ensuing 
subformula property, it follows that LL, is a conservative extension of a sequent 
system considered in [3], which we shall call LL,‘. The system LL: lacks 1, f and 
the quantifiers (the nonmodal fragment of the predicate logic ILZ of [S, Section 
2.51, where 1 and f are denoted by - and 0 respectively, coincides with LL,). The 
propositional part of LLi differs unessentially from LL,’ . For, if in the language of 
LLT we have a nullary connective, i.e. propositional constant, f about which we 
assume nothing in particular, and define 1A as A + f, then we can derive in LL,’ 
the following rules and sequent: 
X!-A A,X+f 
lA,Xcf XtlA 
f+f 
Xtf 
Xcf 
which correspond respectively to (rL) with the proviso that Y is empty, (lR,,,), 
(f L) and (f Rint). In LL,, the connective 1 is not independent, since if X ++ Y 
abbreviates X k Yand Y k X, then in LL, we can prove 1A it A + f. The connective 
1 in LL, is a minimal intuitionistic negation in the style of Kolmogorov and 
Johansson. Some further possibilities of definition in the vocabulary of LL, follow 
from the fact that in this system we can prove fi+lt and T-+lF (actually, we 
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can prove T ik F:, A for an arbitrary A and not only for f, which corresponds to 
T -+ -IF). 
It is then easy to show that X + A is provable in propositional LL, iff it is provable 
in LL’, and that X t is provable in propositional LL, iff X +f is provable in LLT. 
In LL” we cannot prove a sequent with an empty sequence on the right of ä , and 
f stands for such a sequence. 
A consequence of cut elimination is that LL, is closed under the rule: 
+-mA 
(11 elim) ___ 
F-A 
Without (Cut), we can prove +llA only from TAI- , and we can prove -IAF 
only from EA (in [l, Section 1.31, it is remarked that intuitionistic linear proposi- 
tional logic is closed under (11 elim)). In order to show closure of LLi under 
(11 elim) it is essential that we lack Contraction on both sides; the lack of Thinning 
is not essential (cf. Section 7). 
4. Classical linear logic 
Let now L’ be the first-order language that differs from L by not having +, A 
and V primitive. Instead, these constants are defined by 
A+ B dzf l(A.lB), 
AA B dsf T(-IAvTB), 
VxA dsf 13x TA. 
We may also define the connective + (which corresponds to the inverted ampersand 
of PI) by 
A+ B dzf ~(lA.+3). 
The system LL, of classical linear logic, which corresponds to the system in [2], 
is the sequent system in L’given with the structural postulates (id), (Cut), (Permuta- 
tion L) and 
(Permutation R) 
Xk Y,A, B,Z 
XEY,B,A,Z 
and the operational postulates (. L), (.R), (v L), (v R), (1L), (-IR), (t L), (t R), 
(f L), (f R), (T R), (FL), (3L) and (3R) (we have said that the postulates (lR), 
(f R), (T R) and (F L) are (lRi”t), (f Ri,t), (T Ri,,) and (F Lint) without the provisos). 
It is known that by standard Gentzen techniques we can prove cut elimination for 
LL,, but we do not need this fact for the next section. 
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5. The inclusion of classical linear logic in intuitionistic linear logic 
Let 1X be the sequence obtained from the sequence X by prefixing 1 to every 
formula in X. We can then prove the following lemma. 
Lemma. For every sequenr 
provable in LL,. 
X + Y qf‘ L’, X E Y is provable in LL, ifs X, 1 Y i- is 
Proof. From left to right, we proceed by induction on the length of proof of X + Y 
in LL,. The only nontrivial cases in this induction arise when X k Y is obtained by 
one of the rules on the left in the table below; then we use the sequent-schema in 
the same line on the right, which is provable in LL,: 
(.R): (11.) llA.nB t ll(A.B), 
(vR): (11 v) 1lA v 1lB t ll(A v B), 
(3R): (113) 3x 1lA t 113~ A. 
Let us consider the first case as an example. Suppose we have in LL,: 
(.R) 
X’I- Y’, A X”k Y” B 
X’, X”t- Y’, Y”, A. ; 
Then in LL, we have: 
X’, 1 Y’, lA+ 
(Permutation L) 
X”, 1 Y”, 1B k 
(Permutation L) 
(%nt) 
14 X’, 1 Y’I- 
(. R) 
X', 1 Y'+llA 
(lR,,,,) ;,-,W~-, 
x',~Y',X",lY"tl~A~llB 
which together with (11.) and TFI(A. B), l(A. B) t and the rules (Cut) and 
(Permutation L) yields: 
X’, X”, 1 Y’, 1 Y”, l( A. B) k 
To prove (1-1. ) in LL,, we have: 
B+B 
(.R) 
AFA 
(1L) 
A, l3kA.B 
l(A.B), A, BE 
(lR;,,,), (IL) and (Permutation L) 
$A. B), llA, nBk 
from which we obtain (11.) with (TR~,,~) and (. L). 
For the other direction of the Lemma, we use the fact that LLi is included in LL, 
and that 11At A is provable in LL,. 0 
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As a corollary, we obtain the following theorem. 
Theorem. For every formula A of L’, t A is provable in LL, iff + A is provable in LL, . 
Proof. If t A is provable in LL,, then, by the Lemma, TA+ is provable in LL,, 
and hence F TTA is provable in LL,. By closure of LL, under (11 elim), we obtain 
that tA is provable in LL,. The other direction of the Theorem is trivial. 0 
Note that it is not the case for every X that X t A is provable in LL, only if 
X t A is provable in LL, (for example, 11A E A is provable in LL, without being 
provable in LL,). However, for every sequent X!- Y of L’, there is a sequent 
klr(X, 1 Y) of L' such that X t Y is provable in LL, iff tlrr(X, 1 Y) is provable 
in LL,. The formula r(X) is t if X is the empty sequence, and rr(X, A) is rr(X) . A. 
6. Modal linear logic 
Let the languages Lo and L’o be obtained from respectively L and L’ by adding 
the unary connective CJ (which corresponds to the ! of [2]). The sequent system 
LL,’ in LO (which corresponds to the system ILZ of [5, Section 2.51) is obtained 
by extending the postulates of LL, with the following rules: 
(Thinning C) 
XI-W 
uA,Xt W 
(Contraction 0) 
nA,~A,xt W 
uA xt- w 
(OL) 
A,XtW 
(OR) 
r;XtA 
nA,X+ W ~X~GA 
where OX is the sequence obtained from X by prefixing 0 to every formula in X. 
The system LL,o in L’c (which corresponds to the modal system of [2]) is obtained 
by extending the postulates of LL, with these rules (the unary connective 101 
corresponds to the ? of [2]). 
Now, it is not the case that for every A of L’a we can prove t A in LL,n only if 
we can prove F A in LL,o. A counterexample is t- l(ullA. TEA), which is provable 
in LL, but not in LL,. This sequent would be provable in LL, iff q -nAi_l~oA 
were provable. 
7. BCK logic 
The system BCKi of intuitionistic BCK logic is the sequent system in L obtained 
by extending the postulates of LL, with the following structural rule: 
(Thinning L) AxXFww 
> 
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The system BCK, of classical BCK logic is the sequent system in L’ obtained by 
extending the postulates of LL, with (Thinning L) and: 
(Thinning R) 
XkY 
XkY,A 
Cut elimination is proved for BCK, and BCK, by standard Gentzen techniques. 
Then we can easily establish that BCK, is closed under (11 elim). Furthermore, 
we can prove our Lemma and our Theorem when we replace LL, by BCK, and LL, 
by BCK,. 
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